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PREFACE
| Patricia Broadfoot, Chair of Governing Board 
NEW INSIGHTS 
FROM THE ‘LIVING
LABORATORY OF
BRITISH LIFE’
The United Kingdom today is a society in
transition. The impact of the economic
recession, changing lifestyles, an increasingly
heterogeneous population and evolving family
structures are just some of the elements that
are contributing to significant social
change.The choices people make about their
lifestyles – where they live, how they bring up
their children, their leisure activities, even what
they choose to eat – are in turn affected by
these major currents of economic and social
change.
Such issues are the lifeblood of society. They affect the
happiness and perceived well-being of every member of the
population, whether they are still at school or well into
retirement. They are the lived reality of daily life for us all.
This is why this next set of findings from the Understanding
Society longitudinal household survey is so fascinating.
Although the fourteen individual analyses presented in this
collection only deal with a tiny fraction of the data that the
survey has already collected, they provide a rich set of
insights into how people are experiencing life in Britain today.
Several contributions report novel analyses of how people
are feeling in our society. There is an exploration, for
example, of where people turn for emotional support and it
seems this is rather different for men and for women.
Another contribution looks at the causes of job-related
stress. Among young people in particular, the special Youth
Panel data reveal an important relationship between
adolescent lifestyles and an individual’s sense of happiness
and well-being. There is a positive correlation, for example,
between healthy eating, active sports participation, low
alcohol consumption and higher happiness scores.
Snapshots like these of
aspects of contemporary
British life are in many
ways unprecedented.
Because of the size of
the Understanding
Society sample –
approximately 100,000
individuals in 40,000
households – it is
possible to delve into
such topics in
unprecedented detail. 
Understanding Society also contains novel ways of collecting
information from respondents. Through its Innovation Panel
the study challenges social researchers from around the
world to compete in suggesting new methods that will be
even more effective in collecting reliable data. An example
included in this collection explores different ways of
measuring well-being and demonstrates how the way in
which data is collected can affect the results obtained. 
A third, unique, feature of Understanding Society is its ability
to collect robust data on minority groups which in most social
surveys do not normally constitute a large sample. The
ethnic minority boost sample in the Understanding Society
study provides unique insights into particular aspects of life
in a range of ethnic minority communities. In this collection,
for example, this aspect of the study provides data on
migration histories and the diversity of the United Kingdom
population. It also begins to raise what may prove to be
important insights into perceived racial discrimination in the
UK. Is it significant, for example, that about 15% of Chinese
and Caribbean respondents cited racial discrimination as the
reason they felt they had been turned down for a job but
that the Bangladeshi sub-sample did not? The answer may
come from the accumulating insights that Understanding
Society will provide over time.
Fascinating as these insights are, they are just an initial taste
of what will be possible once the findings from
Understanding Society span a number of years. It is
important to know in detail how people in this country are
living – how they manage their families, their money, the
demands of work, what it feels like to live in a particular
community or with a disability, how difficult it is to get a job
Understanding
Society will be the
site of many
important new
discoveries helping to
address pressing
social issues
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and the factors that
influence happiness. But
information that is
collected at only one
point in time – as is the
case with most social
surveys – has only a
very limited capacity to
explain the picture it
presents. It will be the
regular collection year
on year from the same
households, coupled
with the size and make-up of the sample, which will make
Understanding Society an invaluable resource. Because the
study is still in its early stages, the findings presented in this
collection are still largely descriptive but they do provide a
powerful foretaste of the range and depth of analyses that
will be possible in the future.
Understanding Society’s close connection to the world of
policymaking is also unique. The survey is not a conventional
academic exercise as many of the questions asked and the
results obtained have been explicitly designed to inform
Government thinking in key policy areas. Understanding why,
for example, unemployment rates among 16 to 24 year olds
nearly doubled between 2008 and 2010 to almost 20% and
were even higher among those with low educational
achievement is of central importance to informing the
strategic priorities of education and employment policy. With
time, our capacity to understand the factors that lie behind
such statistics will increase considerably and with it, the
ability to make informed judgements about suitable
interventions.
Social science’s focus on people’s experiences in their 
day-to-day lives has tended to rob it of the romance of
scientific discovery. It is also a field in which the collection of
information which is dependable and unambiguous is
necessarily difficult given the focus on people, rather than the
natural world. Understanding Society heralds a change in
this respect by providing a scientific resource on a scale
hitherto more familiar to the natural sciences. Coupled with
the use of the most sophisticated methods for collecting and
analysing information and its accumulation year on year,
Understanding Society will for the first time make it possible
to provide a comprehensive picture of life in Britain today
both for individuals and for households. Understanding
Society will provide the first ever ‘living laboratory of British
life’ – a laboratory that like the natural sciences, will be the
site of many important new discoveries helping to address
pressing social issues.
The results obtained
have been explicitly
designed to inform
Government thinking
in key policy areas
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INTRODUCTION
| Nick Buck, Principal Investigator
This is our second annual publication of
findings from Understanding Society, the UK
Household Longitudinal Study. Understanding
Society is a major social science investment in
longitudinal studies with potentially huge long
term implications for social science and other
research and for the understanding of the UK
in the early twenty-first century. 
It will provide valuable new evidence about the people of the
UK, their lives, experiences, behaviours and beliefs, and will
enable an unprecedented understanding of diversity within
the population. Its longitudinal design, in which the study
aims to collect data at annual intervals from all adult
members of around 40,000 households, as well as young
people aged 10-15, will give a particular insight into how
their lives change, how past events affect future outcomes
and how far people are able to realise their aspirations.
Since the first report of early findings
(http://research.understandingsociety.org.uk/findings/early-
findings) was published in February 2011, three important
new sets of data have been released, all of which are
reflected in this report.
Firstly, the whole of the first wave of the survey, which took
place in 2009 and 2010 has now been released. This
contains just over 30,000 households, including a substantial
ethnic minority boost sample. The capacity Understanding
Society brings to support investigation of the situation and
experiences of ethnic minorities in the UK is a particularly
important feature of the study, and is reflected in a number
of articles here.
Secondly, data from the first year of Wave 2 of the study has
also been released. This includes not only the second
interview with members of households who were first
interviewed as part of Wave 1, but also the first interviews
within Understanding Society of members of the former
British Household Panel Survey, who have been interviewed
for up to 18 waves previously. They will add a very important
long term dimension to the study in its early stage. The Wave
2 data contains information about a number of new topics,
including health related behaviours, social support, conditions
people experience at work and participation in sports and
cultural activities. Most importantly, the Wave 2 data allows
us a first opportunity to look at changes in individuals’ lives
between 2009 and 2010, for example in terms of
employment transition.
Finally, data from the first
two waves of the
Innovation Panel has also
been released. This sample
of 1,500 households
provides an opportunity to
explore ways of improving
the collection of
longitudinal data. Some
results of experimental
work in this panel are
reported here.
Although these are early findings, they cover a wide range of
domains of people’s lives and experiences. The purpose of
the volume is not only to present and share these findings,
but more importantly to give future users of Understanding
Society a sense of the potential of the study. We expect and
hope that these early findings will be rapidly superseded by
further analyses by a much a wider range of researchers.
The data used in this publication are available to the wider
community of researchers through the Economic and Social
Data Service. More detail about the design of the study can
be found in Chapter one and the appendix to our first early
findings report.
Wave 2 data allows
us the first
opportunity to look
at changes in
individuals’ lives
between 2009 and
2010
INTRODUCTION TO 
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INTRODUCTION TO 
ETHNICITY ARTICLES
| Lucinda Platt 
Understanding Society is important for
ethnicity research for three reasons. As a
general purpose survey, it includes a wide
range of content that increase the potential for
such research. In addition, there is also content
that is specifically relevant to the analysis of
ethnicity and ethnic minority experiences.
Finally, because it has a substantial ethnic
minority boost, it provides the numbers to
render that potential a reality and, because of
the range of groups included, it has the
potential to highlight the different patterns of
experience across groups in this sample: there
is not just one minority story any more than
there is one migrant story. 
Examples of the sorts of questions that can be analysed on
the basis of the general content include differences in
employment, education, income, housing, partnership
histories, health, relationships, well-being, children’s
aspirations and how these are different or similar across
ethnic groups – and whether the relationships between some
of them (e.g. life satisfaction and housing, employment and
income) are the same across groups or are different for some
groups than others. 
There are also questions that can be answered, using the
‘ethnicity-relevant’ content. These include the topics
addressed in this volume: about parents’ and grandparents’
countries of birth and identification with parents’ ethnicity;
about internal (within UK) migration histories as well as
international migration; about perceptions of discrimination;
and about remittances.
The internal migration histories can help tell us how
settlement patterns change and how far individuals move
following migration or – for UK born – from the migrant
generation’s area of settlement. This feeds into the ongoing
debates about ethnic segregation and whether it is chosen or
constrained or in fact a myth. 
The extent to which people do or do not perceive processes
of discrimination at work is in itself interesting as is the
extent of harassment experienced or how fear of it constrains
people from minority groups. This also ties in with questions
of ethnic segregation discussed above. It has been proposed
that areas of relative minority group concentration are
protective from or give support in the face of harassment
and intimidation. 
A key issue for remittances is
the extent to which they
decline among those who
have been in the country
longer and across
generations. We would expect
much fewer remittances to be
paid by the second
generation, but the extent to
which they do persist is of
great interest. Remittances
also restrict immediate spending power, and so can result in
‘hidden’ deprivation (as they are rarely measured) since
available income is lower than actual income. 
There are many questions relating to ‘cause and effect’ that
require longitudinal data and where our understanding will
be enhanced when we have multiple years of data. For
example, do people move to or out of areas where there are
other minorities? How does that relate to experiences of or
perceptions of harassment, or to changes in income? The
relationship between language and employment can be
addressed more fully, for example does getting a job improve
your language skills or are those who become fluent in
English more likely to get jobs? Analysts will also be able to
explore whether low incomes are particularly persistent for
some minorities. Other questions include whether people’s
strength of identity change with marriage / children / and
where they live.
The ethnicity strand of Understanding Society will help
provide a proper evidence base around these important and
highly salient issues. This volume indicates just some of that
future potential through exploring the findings deriving from
just one wave of data. 
There is not just
one minority
story any more
than there is one
migrant story
UNDERSTANDING SOCIETY: FINDINGS 2012
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SOCIAL SUPPORT FROM 
FAMILY AND FRIENDS
| Heather Laurie 
There is evidence from other studies of a
‘buffering’ effect of having positive social
support in the face of shocks such as divorce,
ill-health, bereavement, or losing your job.
Having positive and strong social support has
also been associated with better psychological
and physical health as well as positive health
and other behaviours. 
The second wave (collected in 2010) of Understanding
Society included questions on the perceived levels of personal
and emotional support people felt they had from their
partner, other family members and friends. A total of 15,940
respondents (6,936 men and 9,007 women) answered these
questions using a self-completion questionnaire. The data in
the analysis are weighted to reflect the UK population. The
questions included positive aspects of social support and
questions about negative social interaction or lack of social
support. The study also asked whether people have someone
they can confide in and if so, who they are. Understanding
Society provides an opportunity to examine the distribution of
perceived social support across the population and how this
varies by individual and household characteristics. As the
longitudinal data are gathered over the coming years of the
study, this will provide evidence on the role social support
networks play in coping with stressful situations throughout
the life-course, potentially increasing people’s resilience in the
face of adverse life events. 
In the self-completion questionnaire respondents were asked
to rate the following statements for their spouse/partner,
other family members, and friends. Respondents were asked
to say how they felt about each statement with the answers
being ‘A lot’, ‘Somewhat’, ‘A little’, or ‘Not at all’. 
How much do they really understand the way you feel about things?
How much can you rely on them if you have a serious problem?
How much can you open up to them if you need to talk about your worries?
How much do they criticise you?
How much do they let you down when you are counting on them?
How much do they get on your nerves?
When asked to rate their spouse or partner, the majority of
people reported having positive support from their partner
and a minority reported a lack of support: 88% of
respondents said their partner understood the way they feel,
95% said they could rely on their partner if they had a
problem, and 90% said they could talk to their partner about
their worries ‘a lot’ or ‘somewhat’. There were some
differences between men and women. Men were more likely
than women to say their partner understands the way they
feel, can be relied upon if they had a problem, and is
someone they can talk to about their worries. These
differences remained significant when a range of other
characteristics were taken into account. On the other hand,
men were significantly more likely than women to say their
partner criticises them ‘a lot’ or ‘somewhat’, 32% of men
compared with 20% of women. In contrast, women were
more likely than men to say their partner lets them down
(11% of women vs. 8% of men) or gets on their nerves (15%
of women vs. 11% of men). 
Looking at other family members including extended family, the
majority of people report having positive support from their
family and a minority report a lack of support. Women were
significantly more likely to report having positive support from
other family members than men: 74% of women said family
members understood the way they feel ‘a lot’ or ‘somewhat’
compared with 68% of men, 86% of women said they could rely
on family members compared with 82% of men, and 76% of
women said they could talk to family members about their
worries compared with 66% of men, differences which again
hold after other factors were
taken into account. These
gender differences in
perception of support are in
the opposite direction than
for support from partners.
There were no differences
between men and women
in the extent to which they
reported a lack of support
from family members. 
Figure 1 Partner’s positive support and lack of support rated ‘a lot’/‘somewhat’
Understands
way feel
Can rely 
on them
Can talk 
about worries
Criticise you
Let you down
Gets on your
nerves
Percent 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
  Men   Women
Men who have a
spouse or partner
rely heavily on their
partner for positive
social support
Source: Understanding Society: Wave 2
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When asked about their friends, women were more likely than
men to report positive social support. Of women, 83% said
their friends understood the way they felt ‘a lot’ or ‘somewhat’
compared with 71% of men, 83% of women compared with
75% of men said they could rely on their friends and 81% of
women compared with 64% of men said they could talk about
their worries with their friends. Overall, it seems that men are
more inclined to rely primarily on their partner (if they have
one) for positive social support rather than looking to family
members and friends. Women seem to look not only to their
partner if they have one but also to family and friends to a
greater extent than men.
Having a confidant or a person to share private feelings with is
an important component of social support. People were asked
to think of the person they can best share their private feelings
and concerns with and to say whether they were male or
female. Men were far more likely than women to say they
shared their feelings with a woman with 75% of men
compared to 54% of women giving this response. In contrast
just 25% of men said they shared their feelings with a man
compared with 46% of women. Just 4% of men and 2% of
women had no-one at all in whom they could confide. 
Among men with a female confidant, 75% gave their
wife/partner as this person with a further 3% saying they
confided in their daughter, 5% to their mother, 2.5% to a sister,
and 13% to a female friend. Of men saying they confided in a
male person the majority, 67%, said this was a male friend
rather than a partner or other family member, 7% confided in
a son, 6% to their father, and 9% to a brother. 
Women with a male confidant were also most likely to say this
was their husband/partner (82%), 4% confided to a son and
12% to a male friend. However, women who said they confided
in a female person were far more likely than men to say they
confided in their daughter (18%) or in their mother (11%) or a
sister (13%) while 50% said they confided in a female friend. 
In this initial analysis, the gender differences in perceptions of
social support from spouse, family and friends are quite
marked and remain significant after allowing for other
characteristics. Men who have a spouse or partner rely heavily
on their partner for positive social support while women tend
to look more widely to other family members and friends. This
suggests that men and women differ in their approach to their
relationships with family and friends and as the longitudinal
data come on stream we will be able to assess how these
differences relate to measures of well-being and life
satisfaction over time and an ability to withstand unforeseen
shocks. 
The social support questions carried on Understanding
Society can therefore tell us not only the extent to which
people feel they have positive social support or a lack of
support from their partner, family and friends but can also
help us understand something of the nature of the social
networks in which people live their lives and the importance of
those networks in providing personal and emotional support
throughout the life-course. In this initial analysis, other factors
such as differences by country of residence and the impact of
living in an urban or rural environment were not examined but
remain interesting questions for the future once the full 2010
and 2011 data become available. 
Key Findings
• Couple members are highly supportive of each other,
with 95% saying they could rely on their partner if
they had a problem.
• Men who have a partner tend to rely on their
partner for social support. Women are more likely to
view the wider family and friends as supportive.
• The marked gender differences in social support
remain significant after allowing for other
characteristics.
Figure 2 Family’s positive support and lack of support rated ‘a lot’/‘somewhat’
Understands
way feel
Can rely 
on them
Can talk 
about worries
Criticise you
Let you down
Gets on your
nerves
Percent 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
  Men   Women
Figure 3 Friend’s positive support and lack of support rated ‘a lot’/‘somewhat’
Understands
way feel
Can rely 
on them
Can talk 
about worries
Criticise you
Let you down
Gets on your
nerves
Percent 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
  Men   Women
Source: Understanding Society: Wave 2
Source: Understanding Society: Wave 2
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REVISITING THE ‘DOING GENDER’
HYPOTHESIS – HOUSEWORK HOURS OF
HUSBANDS AND WIVES IN THE UK
| Man Yee Kan
This article reviews a debate on the domestic
division of labour: Do husbands and wives try to
fulfil their gender identity when undertaking
housework?  
A resource bargaining perspective suggests that one’s
housework time and the share of housework in the home
decreases with increases in one’s relative contribution to
family income.1 An exception to this pattern is that when the
husband’s income is too low compared to his wife’s, both
partners will ‘do gender’ in order to prevent a further
deviation from the male breadwinner gender norm. That is,
the husband’s housework time and his share of housework
will decrease rather than increase.  This has been found in
research based on data from the US, Australia and Sweden.2-3
In a 2008 study of UK data from the British Household Panel
Study, Kan4 found only limited support for the ‘doing gender’
hypothesis.  
When might gender trump money in the hours of
housework? Theoretically, it occurs when men earn much
lower income than their partners. In practice, the number of
cases of economically dependent husbands is very small, even
in a large scale dataset. Therefore a common problem in past
studies is that the empirical statistical testing of the
hypothesis is based on a small number of cases. The new UK
household panel survey, Understanding Society, with its large
sample provides good data for evaluating the hypothesis. In
this paper, we use the first wave of data to revisit the
hypothesis. There are two research questions: 
1) Are husbands’ and wives’ housework hours negatively associated with
their relative contribution to family income? 
2) Do husbands and wives ‘do gender’ by reducing/increasing their
housework time respectively when the male relative economic contribution is
very low? That is, is there a curvilinear relationship between relative
economic contribution and housework hours?
The data used comes from Understanding Society, Wave 1,
2009-2010. In Wave 1, one quarter of the total sampled
households were asked about their weekly housework hours.
We selected married couples where both partners are at
working age, that is, the wife is younger than 60 and the
husband is younger than 65. The sample contains 1,547
couples. We do not investigate differences among the four
countries of the UK in the present study because of the
limitation in the sample size. All results in this study are
weighted.
First, wives on average undertake about three quarters of the
housework. Their mean housework hours are 15.4 (s.d. 10.6)
per week, compared to 5.8 hours (s.d. 6.6) for men. The
outcomes are husbands’ weekly housework hours, wives’
hours and husbands’ share of housework (defined as
husbands’ housework hours divided by the sum of both
partners’ housework hours). Analyses controlling for additional
variables provide detail as to how housework hours of men
and women might change with characteristics of the
household. The first research question asks about the
relationship of the relative economic independency (or simply
put, one’s income relative to his/her partner) and other
demographic variables with hours of housework. Relative
income is defined as the difference between the respondent’s
income and the partner’s divided by their sum. The squared
term of relative income is added to address the second
research question. 
Focusing on the first question, we see that following the
resource bargaining perspective, when one’s income relative
to his/her partner increases, his/her housework hours
decrease, after controlling for both partners’ total income and
other characteristics of the household (coefficients are -2.417
and -2.256 respectively). Accordingly, the husband’s share of
the housework is less with increases in his relative income. 
Other variables are also related to housework hours. The
number of dependent children is positively associated with
both men’s and women’s housework hours, but the effect on
women is considerably stronger. Both men and women do
more housework when their spouses are employed but they
themselves are not, even when controlling for other
characteristics. Women who have attained a university level of
education do less housework than less educated women, but
educational level is not associated with men’s housework
hours. 
To answer the second research question, a squared term of
economic independency
(relative income) is added to
test whether the relationship
between housework hours
and economic independency is
curvilinear. The squared term
has a significant negative
association with both men’s
and women’s housework
hours. That is, when a woman
earns much more than her
If wives earn
more money do
they undertake
less housework?
REVISITING THE ‘DOING GENDER’ HYPOTHESIS - HOUSEWORK
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husband, she does more
housework instead of less. And
when a man earns too little,
he does less rather than more.
Figure 1 presents the
predicted housework hours
against economic
independency for men. We
see that housework hours has
a slightly curvilinear
relationship with economic
independency, mainly because men who earn much more
than their wives undertake even less housework than
predicted by the resource bargaining perspective. It is not the
case that men who earn less than their partners do little
housework. Rather it is those who earn much more than their
wives do not contribute much to housework. 
For women, there is a strong curvilinear relationship between
housework hours and economic independency as shown in
Figure 1. The negative linear relationship starts to reverse
when the relative independency equals 0.3, i.e. when women
earn about 65% of both partners’ total income. This supports
the hypothesis that women might ‘do gender’ by taking on
more housework when they earn much higher income than
their spouses.
These findings are different from Kan’s4 study. It may be
because there are real changes in the gender norms and how
economic resources affect housework contributions in 2009-
2010 compared to 1991-1998. Second, the present study
has restricted the sample to working age married couples,
while Kan’s (2008) study included married and cohabiting
couples in all age groups.
While married women at working age still undertake three
quarters of housework at home, their housework hours and
share of housework were reduced when contributing a larger
share of family income. Findings of this article, however,
suggest that gender ideology still poses a barrier to gender
equality in the domestic division of labour. When women earn
more than 65% of the family income, their housework time
tends to increase rather than decrease. There is also evidence
to show that men who earn much higher income than their
wives tend to undertake less housework than predicted by the
resource bargaining perspective.
Figure 1 Predicted weekly housework hours against relative economic independency
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Gender ideology
still poses a
barrier to gender
equality to the
domestic division
of labour
Key findings
• Married women of working age do three quarters of
housework.
• Housework hours of married women are less when
contributing a larger share of family income.
• When women earn more than 65% of family income,
their housework hours increase rather than decrease.
Men who earn more than their wives do little
housework.
Further reading
1Manser, M. & Brown, M. (1980). Marriage and
household decision-making: A bargaining analysis.
International Economic Review, 21, 31-44.
2Bittman, M., England, P., Folbre, N., Sayer, L. &
Matheson, G. (2003). When does gender trump money?
Bargaining and time in household work. American
Journal of Sociology, 109, 186-214.
3Brines, J. (1994). Economic dependency, gender and the
division of domestic labour at home. American Journal of
Sociology, 100, 652-688.
4Kan, M. Y. (2008). Does gender trump money?
Housework hours of husbands and wives in Britain.
Work, Employment and Society, 22, 45-66.
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DOES YOUR MOTHER KNOW? 
STAYING OUT LATE AND RISKY BEHAVIOURS
AMONG 10-15 YEAR-OLDS
| Maria Iacovou 
Throughout the ages, parents have fretted
about how much control they should be
exercising over the whereabouts of their
teenage children. This issue has become
particularly relevant in contemporary Britain,
against the backdrop of the riots of 2011, with
‘poor parenting’ being blamed in some
quarters for the disturbances, and with
pronouncements by Parliament and regional
police forces that parents should make sure
they ‘know where their children are’ at night.
This article uses data from the youth questionnaire of
Understanding Society, which asks children aged 10 to 15
how frequently they have stayed out past 9pm without their
parents knowing their whereabouts, over the past month. We
also explore whether this is a ‘bad thing’, and examine
whether there are differences between boys and girls, or
between different age groups. In what follows, we sometimes
abbreviate ‘staying out past 9pm without your parents
knowing where you are’ as ‘staying out late’ – but all the
analysis relates to the same question.
A substantial minority report having done this even once in
the past month (21% of boys and 15% of girls), with a much
smaller proportion (4% of boys and 2% of girls) who report
having done it frequently (10 or more times in the past
month).  Figure 1 shows the percentages of young people
who report having stayed out after 9pm in the previous
month without their parents knowing where they were. As
one would expect, this is much more common among older
children; it is also more common among boys. But even
among 15 year-olds, only a minority (36% of boys and 24%
of girls) say they have been out after 9pm without their
parents knowing where they
are.
The question is whether
staying out late without
parents knowing is a ‘problem
behaviour’ or simply a
manifestation of the fact that
children become more
independent, and their
parents trust them more to
make their own decisions, as they reach their mid-teens. 
We can say that staying out late is associated with other
behaviours and characteristics which our society is inclined to
define as problematic in young people. Table 1 demonstrates
this for 15 year-olds: staying out late without your parents
knowing is associated with visiting pubs or bars more often;
with frequency of alcohol consumption; with smoking, and
with cannabis use. These associations are visible for both
boys and girls, though they are more pronounced for girls in
relation to smoking and drinking. 
Staying out late without your parents knowing is also related
to emotional problems: boys are more at risk of conduct
problems, whereas the relationship between staying out at
night and both hyperactivity and poor self-esteem is much
more pronounced for girls. 
Clearly, these findings do not mean that staying out late
without telling your parents where you are necessarily
‘causes’ a young person to start smoking or using
recreational drugs, any more than smoking would ‘cause’ a
young person to stay out at night. In order to examine why
some groups of young people are more likely than others to
stay out at night, it is more informative to look at other
factors, such as where they live, what sorts of families they
grew up in, and the quality of relationships within the family. 
Analyses which examine or control for all these factors
together reveal that (as we saw from earlier results) young
men are more likely than young women to stay out late
without telling their parents where they are; and the
likelihood of doing this increases over the age range. Living in
social housing or with a single mother also increases the
probability, but living in a stepfamily does not, and the
number of siblings, grandparents or other people present in
the household does not seem to have an effect. There are
differences by nationality, with Scottish teenagers more likely
than those living in England, Wales or Northern Ireland, to
stay out late, and by ethnicity, with youngsters from Asian
backgrounds less likely to stay out late than their white and
African or Carribean counterparts. There are also differences
by the size of the community in which young people live:
those living in hamlets and villages are less likely than those
in towns and cities to go out at night without their parents
knowing where they are. Young people who travel to school
by independent means (on foot, bicycle, bus or train) are
Staying out late
without your
parents knowing
is also related to
emotional
problems
more likely than those who are taken to school by car to stay
out at night. And finally, while family income has little effect
on this particular aspect of youngsters’ behaviour, family
relationships are important: those who hardly ever talk about
important matters with their mothers are more likely, and
those who hardly ever quarrel with their mothers are less
likely, to stay out late. 
This analysis has shown that staying out late without telling
your parents is associated with a number of risky or problem
behaviours, and that the factors associated with staying out
late are complex: some (such as geographical location) may
relate to local entertainment opportunities; some (such as
the mode of travel to school) probably relate to independence
on the part of young people and trust on the part of parents;
while others (most notably family relationships) demonstrate
that social and emotional deprivation also play a role.
Interestingly, while these sets of factors are all significantly
related to staying out late, they are not all related to the
problem behaviours discussed in Table 1. While poor family
relationships are related to both staying out late and to
problem behaviours, other factors such as independent travel
to school are related to staying out late, but not to problem
behaviours. 
This analysis is very much a first look at the issue of staying
out late, and as such, leaves many questions unanswered. In
particular, we have not addressed the distinction between
staying out late without your parents knowing where you are,
and staying out late at all. In addition, for young people who
stay out late without their parents knowing where they are,
there may be a distinction between those who do this with
and without their parents’ consent. At present, these
questions cannot be answered using data from
Understanding Society, but as the sample matures, there
may be scope for refining questions in this way.  
DOES YOUR MOTHER KNOW? STAYING OUT LATE AND
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Stayed out past 9pm without 
their parents’ knowledge…
Never in 1 or more 3 or more
past month times in times in
past month past month
% % %
Boys 5 7 14 *
Girls 4 6 11
Boys 24 44 *** 56 ***
Girls 25 51 *** 64 ***
Boys 10 30 *** 33 ***
Girls 18 41 *** 51 ***
Boys 7 19 *** 38 ***
Girls 5 15 ** 37 ***
Boys 6 10 19 ***
Girls 2 6 ** 7 *
Boys 13 15 15
Girls 12 24 *** 26 **
Boys 18 21 23
Girls 25 37 * 32
Figure 1 Impact of the response scale on reported job satisfaction
Table 1 Frequency of staying out late without parents’ knowledge by gender: 15
year olds
Go to a pub or bar once 
per week or more
Had alcohol more than once
in past month
Smoke
Ever used cannabis
Score of 6 or more on
conduct problems scale
Score of 7 or more on
hyperactivity scale
Poor self-esteem
Notes: Based on a sample of 651 boys and 662 girls aged 15, from Waves 1 and 2 of
the Understanding Society youth sample. Asterisks denote figures where those staying
out one or more, or three or more, times in the past month are statistically different from
those not staying out. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at
1% level.
Figure 1 Percent out late without parents knowing where they are by gender
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Key findings
• Staying out late without parents’ knowledge was
reported by 21% of boys and 15% of girls aged 10 to
15. It was more common in boys and older children.
• For 15 year-olds, staying out late is associated with
risky behaviours: going to pubs, drinking alcohol and
ever using cannabis.
• For 15 year-olds, staying out late is associated with
conduct problems for boys and, for girls, poor self-
esteem and hyperactivity.
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HAPPINESS AND HEALTH-RELATED
BEHAVIOURS IN ADOLESCENCE
| Cara L. Booker | Alexandra J. Skew | Amanda Sacker | Yvonne J. Kelly | 
Recent reports by UNICEF and WHO have
provided a bleak, but improving world ranking
of United Kingdom (UK) youth with respect to
risk behaviours and subjective well-being.1-3
Adolescence is potentially a prime period for
interventions aimed to improve population
health because of the continuities in subjective
well-being and health-related behaviours
throughout the lifecourse and adolescent
subjective well-being and health-related
behaviours predict adult health outcomes. With
the UK’s low standing in youth subjective well-
being, we need to better understand the
relationship between health-related behaviours
and youth subjective well-being.
Using data from the Understanding Society Youth Panel, we
examine whether a range of health-related behaviours is
linked to youth happiness, one of the key components of
subjective well-being. The data used in this study come from
the young people aged 10-15 who completed the Youth self-
completion questionnaire in the first wave of Understanding
Society (N = 4,899 living in 3,656 households). 
A composite measure of happiness was derived from the six
happiness questions, which asked about happiness with
schoolwork, appearance, family, friends, school and life as a
whole. The top 10% were considered to have high happiness.
The health-related behaviours were smoking, drinking
alcohol, consumption of fruit/vegetables, crisps/sweets/fizzy
drinks and fast food, and participation in sport. 
Percentages are weighted to represent their distribution in
the overall UK population, and regression analysis controls
for socio-demographic characteristics of the household. 
Overall, less than 10% of youth reported having smoked
cigarettes and 21% had an alcoholic drink in the last 4 weeks
(Table 1). Two percent of 10-12 year-olds had smoked
whereas 11% of 13-15 year-
olds reported that they had
smoked. Similarly, 93% of the
younger age group said that
they had not had an alcoholic
drink in the last month
compared with 65% in the
older age group. Consumption
of fruit and vegetables was
low and appeared to drop
with age: 17% of those aged
10-12 years reported consuming 5 or more portions a day
compared with 12% of those aged 13-15 years. Additionally,
young people aged 13-15 were more likely to consume fast
food meals and crisps, sweets and fizzy drinks compared to
the younger age group. Participation in sport was less
common among the older age group. Around 34% of young
people aged 10-12 participated in sport every day compared
to 26% of those aged 13-15. Conversely, 7% of the younger
age group participated in the least amount of sport, less than
one day per week, compared to 9% of the older age group.
Similar percentages, 27%, of both age groups participated in
3-4 days of sport per week.
About 15% of 10-12 year-olds had high happiness scores
compared to 6% of 13-15 year-olds. 
Figure 1 shows the association of health-related behaviours
with high happiness scores. These results take into account
age, gender, highest parental education qualification and
household income. Young people who had smoked were
Young people
who smoked
were about three
times less likely
to have high
happiness scores
Table 1 Youth happiness and health-related behaviours by age group among 4899
youth in Understanding Society
Overall 10-12 years 13-15 years
(n = 4899) (n = 2472) (n = 2427)
% % %
Sex
Male 52 52 51
Female 48 48 49
Happiness scale
Deciles 1-9 88 85 94
Decile 10 12 15 6
Smoked cigarettes
Yes 6.6 1.5 12.4
No 93          98.5 87.6
Alcoholic drink in last month
1 occasion per week 2.8 0.4 5.7
2-3 times 7.6 1.6 16
Once only 11 6 19
Never 79 92 59
Fruit/vegetables  per day
0-2 portions 46 40 49
3-4 portions 40 43 39
5 portions 14 17 12
Crisps/ sweets/ fizzy drinks
Most days 44 41 49
Once per week 26 27 25
Now and then/never 30 32 27
Fast food
1 per week 21 17 19
Now and then 49 52 47
Never/hardly ever 30 31 34
Sport
< 1 day per week 6.6 4.2 8.5
1-2 days per week 19 15 22
3-4 days per week 27 27 28
5-6 days per week 18 21 16
Every day 29 34 26
Source: Understanding Society, Wave 1 Youth self-completion, weighted percentages
about three times less likely to have high happiness scores
compared to those who had never smoked. Young people
who drank alcohol at least once per week were four times
less likely to have high happiness than those who reported no
alcohol consumption. Young people who drank between one
and three occasions per week were more than 2.5 times less
likely to report high happiness. 
Higher consumption of fruit and vegetables and lower
consumption of crisps, sweets and fizzy drinks were both
associated with high happiness and adjustment for socio-
demographic factors had little effect on the size of these
associations. There was a mixed pattern for fast food where
young people who reported eating fast food more than once
per week and those who reported never or hardly ever eating
fast food were less likely to have high happiness compared to
young people who ate fast food now and then. 
There was a linear relationship between greater frequency of
sports participation and high levels of happiness. Young
people who reported sport participation two or fewer days
per week were two times less likely to have high happiness
than those who participated in sport every day.
Less than 5% of youth who had smoked or drank alcohol on a
weekly basis had high happiness scores. Individually, smoking
and alcohol use were strongly negatively associated with
youth happiness. Positive health-related behaviours such as
increased fruit and vegetable consumption, lower intake of
crisps, sweets, fizzy drinks and fast food, and greater
frequency of sport participation were linked to high
happiness. 
We know that health-related behaviours and some aspects of
subjective well-being can be traced from adolescence to
adulthood. Therefore, patterning of these can be set in youth.
For these reasons, generating a picture of a range of health-
related behaviours, activities and subjective well-being in a
contemporary UK sample of young people is of great value.
We found similar patterns of fruit and vegetable intake,
drinking and smoking as reported in the 2007 Health Survey
for England.4 There is extensive literature that has
documented the benefits of a healthy diet and physical
activity on health.5 In this article, we find that health-related
behaviours, such as diet and physical exercise, are related to
high happiness in young people. 
Early youth appears to be a time of relatively good health. It
is also a period when individuals develop their sense of
autonomy in their choices. There are clear continuities in
health-related behaviours and subjective well-being into later
life. In light of the recent reports, interventions aimed at
reducing risky health-related behaviours in adolescence may
have an added benefit of increasing subjective well-being in
adults of the UK. 
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Key findings
• Smoking and drinking were negatively associated
with of high happiness.
• Increased participation in sport was associated with
high happiness.
• Increased consumption of unhealthy food and
decreased consumption of fruits and vegetables were
negatively associated with high happiness.
Further reading
1UNICEF. (2007). Child poverty in perspective: An
overview of child well-being in rich countries. Florence,
Italy: UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre.
2World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe.
(2008). Inequalities in young people's health: HBSC
international report from the 2005/2006 survey: Health
Behaviour in School-aged Children. Copenhagen,
Denmark: WHO.
3Bradshaw, J. & Keung, A. (2011). Trends in child
subjective well-being in the UK. Journal of Children’s
Services, 6(1), 4-17. 
4Craig, R., & Shelton, N. (2008). Health Survey for
England 2007. Healthy lifestyles: Knowledge, attitudes
and behaviour. London: Health and Social Care
Information Centre.
5Strong W. B., Malina, R. M., Blimkie, C. J., Daniels, S. R.,
Dishman, R. K., Gutin, B., et al. (2005). Evidence based
physical activity for school-age youth. Journal of
Pediatrics, 146(6), 732-737.
Figure 1 Odds ratios of youth high happiness on health-related behaviours
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Yes
No (reference)
>1 occasion per week
2-3 times
Once only
Never (reference)
0-2 portions (reference)
3-4 portions
>5 portions
Most days (reference)
Once per week
Now and then / never
> 1 per week
Now and then (reference)
Never / hardly ever
< 1 day per week
1-2 days per week
3-4 days per week
5-6 days per week
Every day (reference)
Smoked
cigarettes
Alcoholic
drink in last
month
Fruit /
vegetables
per day
Crisps /
sweets /
fizzy 
drinks
Fast
food
Sport
Source: Understanding Society, Wave 1 Youth self-completion, weighted analysis
Notes: Top 10 percentile of the happiness with life scale. Adjusted for youth age,
gender, highest parental education qualifications and household income.
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HOW DIVERSE 
IS THE UK?
| Alita Nandi | Lucinda Platt
Immigration into the UK is a hotly debated and
electorally salient topic. In popular and political
discourse immigrants are perceived as a threat
not only to labour market or housing prospects
of those settled for longer, but also to cultural
continuity. Immigrants are frequently
represented in popular politics and media as
being additional or extraneous to the
population rather than core to its make-up.
This contrasts with some other countries
where immigration is regarded as part of the
national story even if immigration controls are
nonetheless relatively stringent. 
The UK has also been characterised throughout its history as
a country of multiple populations: more distantly Celts,
Romans, Anglo-Saxons, Jutes, Norse, Normans, French,
Dutch and those fleeing religious persecution in Europe;
more recently, those from other European countries, those
who arrived through the extensive trading networks of the
British Isles, and those with colonial links with the UK. The
largest immigrant flows in recent years have been from the
A8 countries, from Anglophone countries such as US, New
Zealand and Australia and from the pre-2004 EU countries.
Running throughout the history of the UK are substantial
population flows to and from (the Republic of) Ireland.
Moreover, the UK itself is a multiple nation, made up of four
countries with populations who identify themselves, and are
recognised, as distinct. 
This paper therefore sets out to consider two questions. First:
how diverse is the UK in terms of ancestry and heredity, self-
perception and identification with being British? Second: is
self-categorisation as ethnic majority or as minority ethnic
linked to feelings of ‘Britishness’?
Here we can exploit the fact that Understanding Society has
questions on own, parental and grandparental country of
birth, on own and parents’ ethnic group, as well as questions
on Britishness. Questions on parental and grandparental
country of birth were asked of 47,710 adults (16+ years)
living in the sampled households who participated in the
interviews conducted between 2009 and 2010. The question
on Britishness was asked of a smaller group of 17,680
adults. Weights were used to adjust results for sample design
and non-response. 
Within the UK population, 72% was born in England, 9% in
Scotland, 5% in Wales and 3% in Northern Ireland. We find
that 11% of the UK population was born outside the UK, but
29% of the UK population has some connection with a
country outside the UK (that is, either own, parents’ or
grandparents’ birth country is outside UK). Thus the
composition of the UK looks substantially more diverse if we
take into account the parentage of the UK population going
back just two generations. On the other hand, claims to the
UK being a diverse nation should not be overemphasised:
48% of the UK population are only associated with England.
That is, nearly half of the UK population does not even have
connections to the smaller countries of the UK in the last two
generations and have family links only within England. 
Looking together at ethnic
identification and countries
respondents are associated
with suggests that there is
substantial level of
‘assimilation’ to majority
(White British)
identification over even a
relatively small number of
generations. This is found
among a proportion of
those born outside the UK,
There are far more
people in the UK
with non-British
origins than those
who say their
ethnic group is not
White British
Figure 1 Distribution of UK population by country of birth for those born outside
of the UK
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as well as among those with connections to other countries
but born within the UK. While 29% are associated with a
country outside UK, only 14% of UK population define
themselves as of minority ethnicity (3.6% of which are White
Other). In fact, 52% of those who have some connection
outside the UK define themselves as White British, while 17%
of those who were not born in the UK call themselves White
British. Among those with parents from different ethnic
groups, 30% call themselves ‘mixed’ but 35% of them call
themselves White British. How should we view this? On the
one hand this might be regarded as a positive ‘melting pot’
story. On the other, there might be regret at relative absence
of ‘hyphenated’ or multiple identities which allow the
maintenance of cultural claims. 
Second, more people are associated with a country outside
the UK than were born there or define their ethnicity in
terms of it. For example, among UK residents 3.4% were
associated with India, while 1% were born in India and 2%
chose the category ‘Indian’ as their ethnic group. Again, 7%
have parents or grandparents from the Republic of Ireland
while 1% define themselves as Irish, though even fewer, 0.7%
were born there.
Finally, we explored what, if any, was the relationship of the
expressed ethnic identity and claims to Britishness. It might
be a reasonable expectation that those who maintain – or are
ascribed – a minority ethnicity might feel less connected to
notions of Britishness. 
We next investigated whether ethnic category and subjective
assessments of identity intersect. We found that, after
adjusting for sex, age and education (because younger and
more highly educated people express a lower sense of
Britishness), those of minority ethnicity typically express a
stronger British identity than the White British majority. 
This is true of UK and non-UK born minorities (though the 
non-UK born across all groups express a lower sense of
British identity). It is not, though, true of those affiliating to a
‘mixed’ identity. Unsurprisingly, we found that those living in
Scotland and Northern Ireland had lower British
identification (on average) than those living in England 
and Wales. 
On the other hand, for those describing themselves as White
British, being born outside the UK has a negative effect on
British identity. That is, those who ‘assimilate’ to White
Britishness, have a lower sense of British identity than those
who maintain a minority identity. Both these patterns are
opposite to what might be assumed if the expectation was
that expressed identity was meaningful for national
connections. 
In conclusion, there are far more people in the UK with 
non-British origins than those who say their ethnic group is
not White British. In other words, many of the people whose
parents or grandparents were born outside the UK define
themselves as White British. Thus the apparently
homogenous majority is more diverse than is typically
represented. On the other hand, there is a substantial English
core of the UK population: half of the UK population were
born in England as were their parents and grandparents.
Finally, it is clear that expression of minority identity does not
imply alienation from national identity (‘Britishness’), and nor
does majority ethnic affiliation bring with it a stronger
endorsement of national identity. 
Key findings
• Around 14% of the UK population define themselves
as of minority ethnicity but twice this proportion
(around 29%) were born in or have parents or
grandparents born in a country outside the UK. 
• Those who were born in England and for whom both
their parents and all four of their grandparents were
also born in the England make up nearly half of the
total UK population. 
• Ethnic minorities have a stronger sense of Britishness
than the majority. 
Further reading
Manning, A. & Roy, S. (2010). Culture clash or culture
club? National identity in Britain. The Economic Journal,
120 (542), F72-F100.
Runnymede Trust. (2000). Commission on the future of
multi-ethnic Britain. The Parekh Report. London: Profile
Books. 
Figure 1 Impact of the response scale on reported job satisfaction
Figure 2 Self-reported ethnic group of UK residents whose parents were of
different ethnic groups
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EMPLOYMENT AND PERCEIVED RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION
| Shamit Saggar  | Alita Nandi
Employment, wages and job quality all matter
for life chances, well-being and for the
outcomes of the next generation. We know
from a range of sources that there are
substantial differences in employment rates
and in wages across ethnic groups. 
While debate continues about the extent to which these can
be attributed to differences in skills or job availability, there is
evidence that discrimination in employment plays a part in
these differential outcomes. It may also be that awareness
and perceptions of inequalities (whether well founded or not)
in the job market shape job choices and outcomes, even in
the absence of direct experience of discrimination from an
employer or potential employer. So, perceptions of
employment discrimination matter.
The task of identifying and measuring racial and other kinds
of discrimination in employment is a challenge for
contemporary social research. Traditionally, surveys have
been used to shed light on this, starting most successfully
with the 1970 Colour and Citizenship1 study. This was
pioneering in its ambition and findings and showed that
reported discrimination had been understated by previous
researchers and policymakers.
Understanding Society makes important contributions to the
agenda for ethnicity research both by additional questions
relevant to ethnicity and by the over-sampling of ethnic
minority groups. The questions about discrimination are part
of the additional content and are also asked of a comparison
sample from the general population sample component.
How prevalent is perceived racial discrimination in
employment? The initial results from Understanding Society
offer new insights into perceptions of employment and racial
discrimination. First, people can only be turned down for a
job if they apply for one. The rates of those who have applied
for a job and been turned down after an interview or
assessment in the past year, are shown in Table 1. Over a
third of certain black and minority ethnic (BME) groups –
such as Caribbeans and Africans – reported that they fell into
this category. Meanwhile, less than 30 per cent of their white
counterparts said that they had had a similar experience,
much the same as for Indian, Bangladeshi and Pakistanis.
Receiving ‘We regret to inform you’ letters varies considerably
across ethnic groups.
The bar chart (Figure 1) above describes the share of those
turned down who regarded their rejection as being
consequent on one of the following reasons: sex, age,
ethnicity, sexual orientation, health or disability, nationality,
religion, language or accent, dress or appearance. The
majority of respondents did not consider their rejection as
discriminatory in one of these ways. However, around a fifth
of the total population perceived discrimination of some form
as shaping their rejection, and this highlights a widespread
pattern. The ethnic group reporting the highest percentage of
some form of discrimination was Carribean (31%). The other
minority ethnic groups reported rates ranging from 17% to
24%. 
Figure 1 also shows the percentage of those turned down for
a job who gave race or ethnicity as a reason. The range
among the minority groups studied was 1 to 16 percent, and
we must be cautious because of the small absolute numbers
in some cases. As we might expect, the rate was zero among
the White majority, but rose to around 16 per cent among
Caribbeans. Another way of looking at these figures is that
about half of Chinese, Caribbean who felt discriminated
against at all, gave race or ethnicity as a reason. About a
third of Indian, Africans, and Chinese who reported
discrimination in applying for a job gave race/ethnicity as a
reason. Bangladeshi were unlikely to report discrimination for
race/ethnicity. This may be a reflection of occupational
Turned down for a job Number of those
of those who applied? who applied for a job 
Percentage Number
White: British, English, 
28 356Scottish, Northern Irish
Indian 29 311
Pakistani 29 224
Bangladeshi 28 272
Chinese 38 174
Caribbean 35 235
African, other Black 42 357
Other 34 209
Figure 1 Impact of the response scale on reported job satisfactionTable 1 Refusal for jobs in pa t 12 months among different ethnic groups 
Notes: Weighted percentage; unweighted n. Source: Understanding Society, Wave 1
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segregation or specialisation. Paradoxically, as has been
noted, it may be that greater equality can also reveal the
limits to that equality much more clearly. It may suggest that
for the jobs they are applying for Bangladeshi applicants do
not face the same sort of discrimination faced by Chinese
and Caribbean respondents. That is, perceptions of inequality
may shape the array of jobs to which some people apply if
they believe they won't get jobs because of discrimination.
This would be consistent with a discouraged worker line of
argument that has been widely researched.
While a large share of all groups have the experience of
being rejected for a job, about 20 to 30 per cent attribute the
rejection to some form of discrimination. Between half and a
third of discrimination in most minority ethnic groups was
reported related to race or ethnicity. We must weigh these
results against the possibility that people may not always
know whether they have been discriminated against or be
willing to report it as such. It would be interesting to know
whether respondents who do not perceive racial or ethnic
discrimination think that they were rejected or another hired
because the selected applicant was more deserving
(meritorious or for some other reason entirely).
Understanding Society also tried to capture within-workplace
perceived discrimination by asking about being turned down
for promotion in the past 12 months and whether it was for
one of the reasons described above. However, despite the
overall size of the ethnic minority boost, samples sizes are
simply too small to draw meaningful conclusions. Thus such
a significant and salient question must be devolved to
workplace or more specialized studies.
The findings from Understanding Society can contribute to
policy approaches for addressing discrimination. The
examination of discrimination via large scale surveys should
also be supplemented with other methods. This may include
studies of what members of the public think should be done
to address discrimination, experimental tests in actual job
selection situations, and the analysis of administrative
systems and processes. Such varied approaches will be
combined to obtain understanding of institutional practices in
addition to individual behaviour. 
Figure 1 Perceived discrimination for being turned down for a job by reason
among different ethnic groups
Percent 0  5 10 15 20 25 30 35
White
Indian
Packistani
Bangladeshi
Chinese
Caribbean
African
Mixed
Key findings
• Race or ethnicity was seen as a reason for being
turned down for a job in the last year by 6-16% of
most minority ethnic groups.
• There is ethnic variation in the percentage being
turned down for a job and in perceptions of
discrimination. 
Further reading
1Deakin, Nicholas. (1970). Colour, Citizenship And British
Society. London: Panther books. 
  Discrimination for other reason    Discrimination for race or ethnicity
Notes: Weighted percentage. Source: Understanding Society, Wave 1
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UNDERSTANDING REMITTANCES IN
UNDERSTANDING SOCIETY: QUANTIFYING
TIES OVERSEAS AND TIES TO BRITAIN
| Omar Khan | Alita Nandi
Sending money overseas is seen as a key
feature of immigrant behaviour. Globally, the
World Bank has estimated $440 billion were
remitted in 2010, compared to $132bn in 2000
and $69bn in 1990.1 Results from
Understanding Society allow us to appreciate
in greater detail how and why people in the UK
remit money overseas. In summarising and
analysing these findings, we also discuss their
relevance to policy related to migration,
integration, international development and
financial inclusion.
In the Understanding Society questionnaire, the question on
remittances was asked of respondents in the ethnic minority
boost sample and a comparison general population sample.
The first question was: ‘Many people make gifts or send money
to people in another country. Did you send or give money to
anyone in a country outside the UK in the past 12 months for
any of the following reasons?’ Former data has captured formal
remittances or simply personal capital flows between countries.
Overall, 21% of migrants sent money outside the UK in the past
year. Nearly 9 out of 10 (88%) of those making such a payment
sent funds to family members or friends, 12% sent money to
support a local community, and payments for debt or for
personal investments were rare.
The UK Department for International Development notes that
remittances equal or surpass aid budgets. That is, the
contribution of remittances to human development could be as
great as official aid from developed countries. However, since
most people remit to family members or friends, remittances
may not flow straightforwardly to development. Unlike aid for a
water sanitation project or for female education, money sent to
family and friends is less likely to benefit everyone in a
community. 
Remittances varied by ethnicity. Black Africans were the most
likely to remit money (37%); 19-24% of Bangladeshis, Chinese,
Pakistanis, Arabs, Indians and Caribbeans sent money overseas.
Of mixed and other ethnic groups 11-14% made remittances.
However, only 4.1% of White British ethnicity remitted money. 
These findings reflect the link between place of birth and
remitting money; 21% of first generation respondents
reported remitting compared to 12% of second generation
respondents. Within the ethnic group comparisons shown in
Figure 1, those of African ethnicity are the most likely to be
born outside the UK and Caribbeans and Mixed ethnicity
least likely. There is a
personal connection
underlying these patterns.
First generation persons are
more likely to know persons
in the country. Even if they
don’t directly know someone
living overseas, say in the
case of a British-born person
of Pakistani background, they
may still feel an obligation or
commitment to support
extended members of their community.
The length of time people have lived in the UK is also
associated with the likelihood of payments. The proportion
making a payment drops with each additional decade living
in the UK, but exceeds 25% for the first 20 years of living in
the UK and is nearly 20% for those who have lived 30 years
in the UK. We speculate that this is because people are less
likely to still have close family or friends living overseas – the
main target of remittances – after living in the UK for so long.
In some ways, then, remittances are an indicator of how far
people have maintained ties to the countries where they
were born. And although it’s clear that people are more likely
to remit if they were born overseas – and if they were more
recent migrants – the data still suggest that this is a minority
practice (20%). This may mean that fewer migrants intend to
‘return’ to their country of birth than policymakers expect, or
even that they intend to settle in the UK. Two alternative
explanations are that migrants send money through
‘informal’ channels they are unwilling to report, or that they
simply have too little money to remit.
Those on low incomes find it more difficult to save, with the
richest quintile of respondents to Understanding Society
twice more likely to remit than the poorest. However, where
the poorest respondents did report remitting money, they
claimed to remit a much larger proportion of their overall
income. Taking the sample as a whole, roughly half of those
who remitted sent less than 10% of their income overseas.
Among wealthier respondents, only around 4% remitted
more than 30% of their income. Among the poorest
respondents, however, one quarter remitted more than 30%
of their income, and one in twenty remitted more than 70%
of their income.
This is further evidence that low income people can save, as
remittances are a kind of saving. Understanding Society data
on remittances thereby suggests that policymakers could do
Many low-income
immigrants are
remitting a
significant portion
of their income
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more to incentivise savings among low-income Britons more
generally. We conclude on this note because it points to the
relevance of remittances as an indicator of ties to Britain as
well as ties to countries overseas. Given that only one in five
migrants is currently remitting, and only 1 in 10 of the
children of migrants, it appears that sustaining financial ties
to a country overseas is somewhat less common than we
might have suspected. Conversely, we could conclude that
most migrants and their children who do not remit (80%)
have stronger ties to the UK. This, then, could be a sign of
their integration into British society.
At the same time, however, remittances are clearly an
important phenomenon in modern Britain. Using
Understanding Society data on country of birth and the
Office of National Statistics mid-year population estimates,
we estimate that there are 6.3 million adult UK residents
who were born overseas and around 4.6 million second
generation migrant adults. We estimate that in the UK each
year there are remittances from at least 2 million people with
an average amount of around £1,100, or approximately £2.2
billion. The data on remittances from Understanding Society
has allowed us to understand better how and why migrants
and their children in the UK send funds overseas.
Key findings
• Remittances are more common among migrants, and
more common among second-generation than
among third generation.
• However, even among migrants to the UK, only 21%,
or one in five, reported remitting money.
• Black Africans were most likely to remit money, with
37% or more than one in three doing so. Very few
White British respondents remitted money.
• Many low-income people are remitting a significant
portion of their income, with a quarter of the poorest
remitting more than 30% of their income, and one in
twenty remitting more than 70%.
Further reading
1Migration Policy Institute. (2012). The global
remittances guide. Retrieved from
http://www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/remittance
s.cfm.
Proportion of income remitted % remitting
Income 1- 10- 20- 30- 40- 50- 60- 70- 80- 90-
Quintile 9% 19% 29% 39% 49% 59% 69% 79% 89% 100%
Poorest 
quintile 10.4 55.1 11.0 7.1 7.7 3.1 1.0 1.7 1.2 1.6 4
Quintile 
2 73.3 10.1 7.5 1.8 4.3 0.9 0.5 0.5 1.0 0.2 4
Middle 
quintile 49.1 13.5 5.2 29.2 0.4 0.2 1.1 0.5 0.5 0.2 4
Quintile 
4 38.1 44.9 2.0 1.4 2.0 11.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 7
Wealthiest 
quintile 56.4 28.8 11.1 1.3 1.1 0.1 1.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 10
Total 50.2 29.4 7.0 6.0 2.2 3.6 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.2 6
Figure 1 Impact of the response scale on reported job satisfactionTable 1 Proporti n of income remitt d among hose m king payments, by income quintiles
Source: Understanding Society, Wave 1
Figure 2 Proportion remitting by years since arrival to UK
Percent 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Less than a decade ago
2 decades ago
3 decades ago
4 decades ago
5 decades ago
Figure 1 Proportion remitting among different ethnic groups
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Black African
Caribbean
Other Black
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HOW MOBILE ARE IMMIGRANTS, AFTER
ARRIVING IN THE UK?
| Ludi Simpson | Nissa Finney
Where in the UK were you living when you
were 14? How far from that place is your
current home address? Readers of
Understanding Society publications, as
professionals who have moved during their
higher education and early career, are likely to
be tens or hundreds of miles from their
childhood residence. But most people don’t
move so far: 42% of UK-born residents live
within 5 miles of where they were when they
were 14; only 20% moved more than 100 miles.
See Table 1.
These figures from Understanding Society reveal how we
migrate over our life time. The census and most
administrative records provide a record only of our most
recent move.
Immigrants – all those born outside the UK – have a different
experience of migration by virtue of having already made at
least one major move. Is it a consequence that immigrants
also have a different pattern of movement within the UK? On
the face of it, that is not the case. Table 2 shows that 41% of
immigrants live within 5 miles of where they first lived in the
UK and only 25% live more than 100 miles away.  
For a few years after arriving in the UK, housing and
employment are likely to be temporary or insecure as the
immigrant gets to know where he or she can fit in. This is
especially so as most immigrants are young adults who have
fewer ties to keep them in the same place. But again, this
seems to overestimate the mobility of immigrants.
Understanding Society tells us that of those who migrated to
the UK less than five years prior to their interview, 67% have
not moved further than 5 miles from their first address 
If there are moves due to instability of housing and
employment, these are usually within local housing and
labour markets.
Understanding Society has
a wealth of intelligence
about migration which will
take some careful
preparation to yield robust
interpretations.
Respondents have not
finished their life migration
history, so what each
reports about their past
migration will be
influenced by their age and their stage of life. 
We find for example that South Asian ethnic groups taken as
a whole – whether born in the UK, recent immigrants or
longer-residing immigrants with longer stay in the UK – are
less likely to have moved long distances than Black groups
taken as a whole. Such differences between groups may be
due to compositional effects – of age and class in particular –
but may also be a result of a balance of priorities between
local family and personal advancement that may motivate a
move, or demotivate it.
It is particularly hard to interpret the number of changes of
address a person has made so far in their life, without taking
into account the number of years that person has been able
to move. One can begin to make an appropriate analysis by
dividing the number of moves since age 14 (or since arrival
in Britain at a later age) by the number of years in which the
moves may have been taken. 
Those born in the UK have had on average 0.21 moves per
year of exposure, or approximately one move each five years.
This varies from 0.34 moves per year for young adults aged
16-29, to 0.11 moves per year during all their life since age
14 for those aged 60+. These patterns for UK-born are
similar for immigrants, although again the South Asian
groups as a whole have lower mobility on average than the
Black groups taken as whole. 
The tabulations for individual groups are not shown because
they involve small samples. However, they suggest a richer
analysis is possible. For example, greater mobility is probably
not a simple product of greater economic and educational
resources. The Indian group which has greater incomes and
higher levels of education on average than the Pakistani and
Bangladeshi groups in Britain, also have lower mobility, but
all three groups move less far from their home at age 14
than the average. In contrast, the African group is on average
noticeably more mobile. Among Africans arriving within the
previous five years, only 33% had stayed within 5 miles
compared to the 67% of all recent migrants, and 26% had
moved fifty miles or more, compared to the 14% of all recent
migrants. Migrants from countries with shorter history of
migration to the UK will have fewer relatives and
acquaintances on from whom to draw useful experiences,
and for this reason perhaps be willing to take greater risks in
moving between cities. It could be particularly fruitful to
combine these indicative results with more powerful
statistical analysis, and with insights from qualitative data.
Just as the census and most surveys do not record individual
migration histories within the UK, they also do not ask about
moves outside the UK. Understanding Society has begun
Greater mobility is
probably not a
simple product of
greater economic
and educational
resources
Notes:
White British are White Scottish/Welsh/English/Irish. Other White includes Gypsy/Roma. Mixed are four groups. South Asian are Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi. Black are
Caribbean, African and Other Black. Other groups are Chinese, Other Asian, Arab and Any other group.
Source Understanding Society, Wave 1 weighted analysis
Notes:
White British are White Scottish/Welsh/English/Irish. Other White includes Gypsy/Roma. Mixed are four groups. South Asian are
Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi. Black are Caribbean, African and Other Black. Other groups are Chinese, Other Asian, Arab and Any other group. The first UK residence is the
residence at age 14 if immigrated when younger.
Source Understanding Society, Wave 1 weighted analysis
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that task by asking about other countries in which
respondents lived. Every immigrant to the UK has lived in at
least two countries, the UK and the country of their birth, but
Understanding Society records that the average number of
countries lived in by immigrants is 2.4. This doesn’t quite
mean that forty percent have lived in a further country other
than the one from which they came to the UK, because some
will have lived in more than three countries, but it indicates
the scale of immigrants’ international experience.
Understanding Society, unusually among UK surveys,
captures some information about emigration, by recording
the number of countries lived in by those born in the UK. The
UK is counted as one country in this case. The average is 1.2,
which suggests that up to 20% have lived outside the UK in
their lifetime. The figure is not greater for Black or Asian
ethnic group residents born in the UK than for the White
British born in the UK.
These first tastes from the migration histories of
Understanding Society suggest that there is a rich meal of
unique information to be reported on in future. Countries of
the UK have not been treated separately in these analyses,
but may provide insights into the relationship between
identity, birthplace and mobility.
Key findings
• 42% of UK-born residents live within 5 miles of where
they were when they were 14; only 20% moved more
than 100 miles.
• After arrival in the UK, immigrants are not noticeably
more mobile than the UK-born. 
• African immigrants have been more mobile than
average and South Asians, whether immigrants or
UK-born, have been less mobile than the average. 
Further reading
Finney, N. (forthcoming, 2011). Understanding ethnic
differences in migration of young adults within Britain
from a lifecourse perspective. Transactions of the
Institute of British Geographers. 
Catney, G., Finney, N., Taylor, J. & Twigg, L. (editors).
(forthcoming 2011). Special Issue: New migrations and
the complexities of ethnic integration. Journal of
Intercultural Studies.
Simpson, L. & Finney, N. (2009). Spatial patterns of
internal migration: Evidence for ethnic groups in Britain.
Population, Space and Place, 15, 37-56 .
Figure 1 Impact of the response scale on reported job satisfactionTable 1 Distan e mov d in the UK since ag  14 for UK born
Table 2 Distance moved from first UK residence for immigrants (not UK born)
Less than 2-5 miles 5-20 miles 20-50 miles 50-100 miles More than Unweighted N
2 miles 100 miles
% % % % % % %
White British 24 18 18 12 8 19 1074
Other white groups 0 0 0 31 0 69 20
Mixed groups 17 21 18 9 11 25 289
South Asian groups 31 23 17 7 4 17 604
Black groups 16 26 26 9 4 18 454
Other ethnic groups 24 18 24 9 8 17 159
All born in UK 23 18 18 12 8 20 2600
Less than 2-5 miles 5-20 miles 20-50 miles 50-100 miles More than Unweighted N
2 miles 100 miles
% % % % % % %
White British 0 39 0 0 21 40 68
Other white groups 17 18 21 13 3 27 139
Mixed groups 26 17 21 9 5 20 148
South Asian groups 30 22 17 8 6 17 1826
Black groups 16 22 27 10 6 18 1158
Other ethnic groups 25 16 22 8 6 22 835
All immigrants 18 23 18 9 8 25 4174
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MOVING HOME: WISHES, EXPECTATIONS,
AND REASONS
| Birgitta Rabe
Moving home is often associated with life
events such as forming or dissolving a
partnership which may alter housing
preferences and needs. Moreover, the
neighbourhood as well as the unsuitability of
the dwelling can be a source of dissatisfaction
with the current location. In the context of a
recession and constrained mortgage markets,
the ability of households to realise desired
changes in location may be reduced. This
article uses data from Waves 1 and 2 of
Understanding Society to investigate moving
desires and expectations, as well as actual
moves and their reasons.
The analysis focuses on those adult 16,014 individuals from
the general population sample that have been interviewed at
both Waves 1 and 2 of Understanding Society to date, and
for whom information is available on the main variables of
interest. To assess moving desires and expectations, we make
use of answers to the questions ‘If you could choose, would
you stay here in your present home or would you prefer to
move somewhere else?’, and ‘Do you expect you will move in
the coming year?’ We also assess the reasons for any move.
Moreover, we use information on the urbanicity of
households’ neighbourhoods by using urban and rural
classifications. We define urban as living in a settlement of at
least 10,000 people. Finally, we merge to Understanding
Society external information on deprivation in the local area
using the Carstairs score, which is based on Census data and
is available for Britain only. This is a summary measure of
material deprivation for geographic localities. 
Looking first at moving desires and expectations, Table 1
shows the relationship between neighbourhood
characteristics and wanting to move, expecting to move and
actually moving in the time-period 2009-2010. It shows that
individuals living in urban areas have a higher preference for
moving than those living in rural areas, and they are also
more likely to expect to move within the next year. Likewise,
individuals living in the most deprived Lower Level Super
Output Areas of Britain as measured by the Carstairs score
have a high preference for moving (45% state that they wish
to move). In contrast, among those living in the least
deprived areas, 29% wish to move, and they are also least
likely to actually expect to move within the next year. 
Focusing now on the extent
to which individuals actually
move when they wish or
expect to do so, Table 1
shows that among individuals
wishing to move only 10-
14% do so. Even among
individuals expecting to move
within the next year, this only
happens to 23-36% of them.
People in urban and in less
deprived areas are more likely to see their moving
preferences satisfied and their moving expectations fulfilled
than individuals living in rural and more deprived areas.
Overall, 6.4% of individuals moved between 2009 and 2010.
Among those individuals who would like to move but were
unable to do so, there are a high proportion of pensioners,
whereas employed individuals are more successful in moving
if they want to. This may suggest that pensioners lack the
means to improve their housing situation. Moreover home
owners - owning their houses outright or on a mortgage –
are less likely to see their moving desires satisfied. This may
be a result of the housing markets that saw falling house
prices and of drops in mortgage approvals in the time period
covered by the data.
Figure 1 shows the reasons for moving home given by
movers in Understanding Society. Of all individuals who have
moved between 2009 and 2010, moving for housing related
reasons was the single most important reason given,
mentioned by 40% of movers. Family related reasons also
ranked highly and were mentioned by 25% of respondents.
The desire to
move and moving
expectations are
lowest in the least
deprived areas
Source: Understanding Society, Waves 1 and 2, weighted analysis.
Figure 1 Impact of the response scale on reported job satisfactionReasons for moving house 2009-2010
Percent 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Area related move
Education related move
Employer related move
Family related move
Housing related move
Other reason
Apart from the residual ‘other’ category, area related reasons
came third with mentions from 12% of movers. 
A number of life changes underlie these responses among
movers. In the area of housing, for example, 17% of movers
who were previously renting bought a house at their new
location. 33% of social renters moved into other tenure types
such as private renting, and 10% of individuals moved from
other tenure types into social renting. Looking at family
transitions, 27% of movers not previously cohabiting moved
in with a partner and 9% of movers separated from a
partner. Finally, 31% of movers from rural areas moved into
urban areas, whereas only 11% of movers from urban areas
moved to rural ones. 
In summary, the analysis shows stark contrasts between
individuals wanting and expecting to move and their actual
moving behaviour. Individuals living in urban and in less
deprived areas are more likely to see their moving
preferences satisfied and their moving expectations fulfilled
than individuals living in rural or more deprived areas.
Moving home is mainly motivated by housing, family and
area related reasons and is accompanied by important
transitions in people’s lives. Future research may want to look
into how these diverse circumstances translate into people’s
well-being.
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Key findings
• Forty-five percent of persons living in the most
deprived areas want to move home, compared to 29%
in the least deprived areas. 
• Individuals living in urban areas have a higher
preference for moving than those living in rural areas,
and are also more likely to expect to move within the
next year.
• Moving home is mainly motivated by housing, family
and area related reasons and is accompanied by
important transitions in people’s lives.
Further reading
Ferreira, P. & Taylor, M. P. (2009). Residential mobility,
mobility preferences, and psychological health. In M.
Brynin & J. Ermisch (eds), Changing Relationships (pp.
157-175). London: Taylor & Francis.
Morgan, O. & Baker, A. (2006). Measuring deprivation in
England and Wales using 2001 Carstairs scores. Health
Statistics Quarterly, 31, 28-33. 
Rabe, Birgitta & Taylor, M. P. (2010). Residential mobility,
neighbourhood quality, and life-course events. Journal of
the Royal Statistical Society Series A, 173, 531-555.
Notes: Deprivation quartiles based on Carstairs score exclude Northern Ireland.
Source: Understanding Society wave 1 and 2, weighted analysis.
Table 1. Area-level characteristics and residential mobility
Like to move of which move: Expect to move of which move:
Percentage number Percentage number Percentage number Percentage number
Urban 39 4,759 13 629 14 1,668 34 568
Rural 28 1,030 10 99 10 359 23 84
Deprivation 1 (least deprived) 29 1,111 14 157 10 381 36 137
Deprivation 2 34 1,396 13 180 12 497 36 177
Deprivation 3 41 1,453 11 165 14 480 30 145
Deprivation 4 (most deprived) 45 1,329 12 166 17 500 28 140
N: 16,014
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HIGHER EDUCATION AND SOCIAL
BACKGROUND
| Peter Elias  | Kate Purcell
Prior to the period of expansion commencing in
the late 1980s, participation in higher
education in the UK was very much the
preserve of the higher social groups. In 1962
almost three quarters of first degree students
were from non-manual backgrounds, a
proportion that had changed little over the
preceding 30 years. Given the remarkable
increase in the participation of young people in
higher education that has taken place over the
last 20 years, we investigate whether or not
this expansion has broadened access to less
privileged groups.
Policy makers stress that access to higher education can be
used as an instrument of social justice, particularly via its
potential to promote inter- and intra-generational mobility.
There is contradictory evidence about trends in inter-
generational mobility over this period even in studies using
the same data source. Improvements in data resources are
needed to inform this debate. Problems relating to the
operationalisation of the concepts of social class or by the
use of poor quality proxy indicators for measures of social
class also make evidence about fair access to higher
education difficult to interpret. As examples, recent policy
documents, 1-2 derive measures of the social background of
applicants to higher education from information about
parental occupations recorded on their application forms.
There are, however, weaknesses in these measures. Social
class information could not be determined for nearly one
quarter of applicants and accurate coding was not possible
for a large share of those giving such information. Indicators
of trends in participation by socio-economic groups have also
categorised ‘Small employers and own account workers’ with
‘Lower supervisory and technical, routine and semi-routine
occupations’, a decision at odds with work we have
undertaken on the classification of graduate occupations.3
Here we draw on new information from the first wave of
data from Understanding Society. Like its predecessor, the
British Household Panel Study, the survey collects
information on the occupations held by the respondent’s
parents when he/she was 14 years old, but from a much
larger sample of households across the UK. Two age cohorts
are defined: respondents aged 22 to 34 years and those
aged 37 to 49. The younger age group can be termed the
‘post-expansion’ age cohort. Respondents within this age
range who have a first degree will have obtained this
between 1996 and 2009. On the whole graduates within the
older age group will have obtained their degrees prior to
1992, though there may also be a number of degree holders
who graduated as mature students. For the younger age
group the proportion stating that they have a first degree or
higher in Understanding Society is 34.3%. This compares well
with 34.9% recorded in the UK Labour Force Surveys for
2009-2010. For the older cohort these proportions are
25.7% in Understanding Society and 25.4% in the Labour
Force Surveys.
The bar chart below
shows the socio-economic
backgrounds of degree
and non-degree holders
for the two age groups.
Socio-economic
background is determined
via reference to the
occupation held by the
respondent’s father when
he/she was 14 years old
as recalled by the
respondent. If no paternal occupation was given, reference is
made to the mother’s occupation. This information is mapped
into the National Statistics Socio-economic Classification
(NS-SEC) based on the latest version of the UK Standard
Occupational Classification (SOC2010).4 Parents who held
occupations as small employers or own account workers are
placed in the ‘Intermediate occupations’ in the three-category
version of this classification.
The first point to note from this comparison is the extent of
the shift in parental social class that is in evidence. This
reflects the restructuring of the UK economy from the 1970s
to the turn of the century. The proportion of the younger
cohort with ‘Managerial and professional’ social backgrounds
expands from 23.5% of the older age group to 27% in the
younger group, with a corresponding decline in the
proportions with ‘Routine and manual’ social backgrounds
from 39.8% to 33% in the younger age group. There is an
increase of just over 3% of the younger age cohort for whom
social background information could not be determined.
Within each of the bars in this chart we show the proportion
of respondents who hold a first degree or higher. Here we
observe that the 8.6% increase in the proportion of
respondents in the younger cohort who have a degree is not
uniformly experienced across the three social groups defined
in this analysis. For those with parents who held ‘Managerial
and professional’ jobs when the respondent was 14, the rise
is 10%. For those with parents who had ‘Intermediate
The proportion with
a first degree or
higher was 34% for
the post-expansion
cohort and 26% for
the older group. 
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occupations’ (typically clerical and sales jobs or those running
small businesses) the increase in the proportion with a
degree shown between the two age groups is over 11%
whereas for those who parents with ‘Routine and manual
occupations’ the growth in the proportion with a degree is
only 5%. In other words, the major increase in participation in
higher education that took place in recent years has arisen
primarily because of the increased participation in higher
education from children whose parents held white collar
occupations.
A more detailed investigation of these trends in higher
education participation and social background (not illustrated
here) reveals that, for respondents with ‘Managerial and
professional’ social backgrounds, the major increase in
participation in higher education has come not from those
whose parents held high level managerial jobs or were in the
established professions, but from respondents whose parents
held ‘Lower managerial, administrative and professional
occupations’. This includes respondents who reported that,
when they were aged 14, their parents held jobs such as
school teachers, nurses, administrative grade civil service
occupations and high level technicians – jobs which did not
require a degree 20 to 30 years ago but which are now
regarded as graduate jobs. 
Further investigation of these trends is continuing, looking
particularly at the relationship between parental educational
qualifications, the respondent’s schooling and the
respondent’s participation in higher education. Variations by
gender will be explored given that the growth in women’s
participation in higher education has been progressively
higher than for men throughout the period of expansion.
With the different system of higher education that exists in
Scotland, country variations in these findings will also be
investigated. We will seek to check the robustness of the
findings reported here, to examine whether or not the
proportion of respondents for whom we cannot measure
their social background affects the results. 
To conclude, the brief and preliminary analysis presented
here reveals little evidence that the much vaunted policy
ambition, to provide better access to higher education to
those from less advantaged social backgrounds, has been
apparent through the period in which there has been a major
expansion of participation in higher education by young
people.  
Key findings
• Parental social class of the post education expansion
cohort (aged 22-34) has a greater representation in
managerial and professional occupations and less in
routine/manual than those aged 37-49.
• The proportion with a first degree or higher was 34%
for those aged 22-34 and 26% for those aged 37-49.
• The increase in participation in higher education has
come from people with white collar parents.
Further reading
1Cabinet Office. (2009). Unleashing aspiration: The final
report of the panel on fair access to the professions.
London: Cabinet Office.
2Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. (2009).
Higher ambitions. The future of universities in a
knowledge economy. London: Department for Business,
Innovation and Skills.
3Elias, P. & Purcell, K. (2004). Is mass higher education
working? Evidence from the labour market experiences
of recent graduates. National Institute Economic Review,
90, 60-74. 
4Office for National Statistics. (2010). The National
Statistics Socio-economic Classification (NS-SEC
rebased on the SOC2010).
(http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-
method/classifications/current-standard-
classifications/soc2010/soc2010-volume-3-ns-sec--reb
ased-on-soc2010--user-manual/index.html#6 )
Figure 1 A comparison of parental social background and higher education,
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Little evidence that the
much vaunted policy
ambition, to provide
better access to higher
education to those from
less advantaged social
backgrounds, has been
apparent
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JOB-RELATED STRESS, WORKING TIME 
AND WORK SCHEDULES
| Mark L Bryan
Work can be a source of both meaning and
fulfilment, but excessive job demands can also
cause anxiety and stress. Work-related stress is
of interest in the UK following evidence of
significant work intensification during the
1990s and persistence of high job strain into
the 2000s. 
The second wave of Understanding Society carries a module
of questions about work conditions including two measures
of ‘affective well-being’ developed by work psychologists. The
two measures – job-related anxiety and depression – are
both negative states, but they differ in their associated levels
of arousal. Anxiety is a state associated with high arousal,
sometimes triggered by feeling threatened, while depression
is characterised by low arousal, often triggered by loss.
Different job characteristics are expected to have different
effects on the two states. For example, excessive demands
may lead to anxiety rather than depression, while a lack of
opportunity to use skills may be more strongly associated
with depression. This article focuses on anxiety (as an
indicator of stress) and documents its relationship with two
aspects of the demands of a job, the number of hours it
requires and the timing of the work.
Respondents to the anxiety questions were asked to say how
much of the time over the last few weeks their job had made
them feel ‘tense’, ‘uneasy’ or ‘worried’ (respondents answered
on a five-point scale ranging from ‘never’ to ‘all of the time’).
The individual answers (from 3,637 men and 4,330 women)
suggest significant levels of anxiety among employees: 46%
felt tense, 27% felt uneasy and 24% were worried at least
some of the time. However, not everyone was stressed.
Indeed a fifth of employees reported that they never felt
tense, while nearly half were never uneasy or worried by
their job. Extreme anxiety was also relatively uncommon –
only 7% felt uneasy or worried and 16% felt tense most or all
the time. 
The answers to the feeling tense, worried, or uneasy
questions were averaged to create an overall anxiety score,
where 1 corresponded to never feeling tense, worried or
uneasy, and 5 indicated feeling tense, worried and uneasy all
the time. Usual weekly working hours were classified as
part-time work (30 hours or less), standard full-time work
(31-48 hours per week) or long-hour jobs (more than 48
hours). Men and women are considered separately because
their employment and well-being patterns are different. 
Women reported feeling more stressed than men, but only
slightly so (their average score was 2.1, compared with 2.0
for men). However, as shown in Figure 1, more hours were
associated with greater job-related anxiety for both men and
women. Women in standard full-time jobs reported an
anxiety score of 2.2, compared with 1.9 for part-timers.
Meanwhile women working long hours reported substantially
higher anxiety scores, 2.5 on average. The pattern for men is
similar, but with a smaller gap between standard full-time
men, reporting a score of 2.0, and men working long hours,
who reported an anxiety score of 2.2. Thus it appears that
women working long hours are more stressed than their
male counterparts. There are many fewer women who work
long hours than men, only 7% of female employees
compared with 21% of male employees. The finding that
longer hours are associated with more anxiety is consistent
with previous studies which have examined the relationship
between working hours and affective well-being.
These patterns also emerge looking within occupations (for
example, clerical workers only), therefore the association of
longer hours with more anxiety is not explained by the fact
that jobs with longer hours tend to involve more
responsibility and pressure (although jobs with more
responsibility are also associated with more anxiety,
independently of hours). Furthermore long hours also appear
to be a source of anxiety even for those reporting a lot of
influence over their start and finish times.
Figure 2 focuses on job-related anxiety and the timing rather
than the amount of work for full-time workers. It shows the
level of anxiety across different daily schedules (day work
only, days and evenings, night work, and rotating shifts or
Figure 1 Job-related anxiety by hours worked and gender
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varying times) and, separately, across weekly schedules
(working most or every weekend, working some weekends
and never working weekends). Compared with women
working days only, women working both days and evenings
reported higher anxiety levels (2.2 for days only versus 2.4
for days and evenings), while men working days reported
slightly lower anxiety than other men. Otherwise, there
appears to be little variation in anxiety across daily work
schedules. 
Turning to weekly
schedules, we see that
weekend work was
somewhat more
stressful than working
weekdays only (women
working every weekend
reported an anxiety
score of nearly 2.3
compared with 2.2 for
women working
weekdays only). As for daily schedules, however, the range in
anxiety levels is more limited than in Figure 1, suggesting
that the amount of work has a bigger influence on anxiety
than when work is done. 
From additional analyses, job-related depression is less
affected by total working hours than is anxiety, but somewhat
more closely linked to work schedules. In particular evening
and especially night work are associated with higher levels of
depression. A complete picture of work-related well-being
would also include the job and life satisfaction indicators
collected in Understanding Society, and would consider the
activities of other household members and possible conflicts
between home life and work. As a household-based survey,
Understanding Society is ideally suited to teasing out these
links. 
The job-related anxiety and depression questions are
scheduled to be repeated in Understanding Society every
two years. As most previous research into affective well-
being has used data at a single time point only, this will offer
an unprecedented opportunity to track changes in well-being
as individuals move across jobs and experience changes in
their household arrangements.  
Key findings
• Longer working hours are linked to higher anxiety
levels, among both men and women.
• The timing of work has a smaller impact on anxiety
levels than the number of hours worked, but
weekend working is associated with slightly higher
anxiety among both men and women.
Further reading
Green, F. (2008). Work effort and worker well-being in
the age of affluence. In R. J. Burke & C. L. Cooper (eds).
The Long Work Hours Culture. Causes, Consequences
and Choices. Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing Ltd.
Warr, P. B. (2007). Work, Happiness, and Unhappiness.
Macwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Long hours are
associated with
more anxiety,
especially for
women
Figure 2 Job-related anxiety by work schedule and gender
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EMPLOYMENT TRANSITIONS AND THE
RECESSION
| Karon Gush  | Mark Taylor
As the British economy struggles to emerge from
its first recession in almost twenty years, and the
worst recession since the Second World War in
terms of loss of output, data from the UK Labour
Force Survey suggest that the unemployment
rate has remained lower than at the same stage
in previous recessions. 
Based on the International Labour Organisation (ILO) definition,
it has so far peaked at less than 9%, compared with 10% at the
same stage in the recessions of the 1980s and 1990s.1 Falls in
the employment rate have also been modest compared with
previous recessions.2 Taken at face value, these facts suggest
that the labour market has remained relatively strong.
However, the employment prospects of particular population
subgroups have been affected more than others. Those of
young people, in particular, have been hit hard. For example
unemployment rates among 16–24 year olds doubled between
2008 and 2010 to almost 20%, and were even higher among
those with low educational achievement.1 In contrast,
unemployment rates among 25-49 year olds remained below
7%. While these mask the impacts of the recession on older
people through, for example, reductions in working hours and
moves into part-time employment, young people are always
more adversely affected by economic downturns. However they
have been affected much more by the recent recession than
previous recessions, relative to older workers.
We exploit newly released data from Understanding Society,
together with data from its predecessor the British Household
Panel Survey (BHPS), to examine how transitions into and out
of employment among people of different ages were affected
by the recent recession. We summarise employment rates in
the period immediately prior to the recession (2006–2008) and
in the recessionary period itself (2009–2010) and identify and
compare annual transition rates into and out of work among
various age groups. All analysis focuses on individuals of
working age (16–59 for women/16-64 for men) who are not in
full-time education or on a government training scheme. 
Figure 1 summarises employment rates by age over the period.
This reveals a number of interesting patterns. First,
employment rates were consistently higher for those between
the ages of 25 and 44 than for younger workers and workers
over the age of 44. Before the recession, employment rates of
25-44 year olds were around 85%, compared with 80% among
those younger than 25 and 75% among those older than 44
years. Employment rates among young people are relatively
high because those in full-time education are excluded from
the analysis, although 20% of young people not in full-time
education or government training were also not in work.
Employment rates for those aged over 44 are relatively low
because people of this age are more likely than those of
younger ages to be in retirement or long-term sick. Second,
patterns in the employment rates of 25-34 and 35-44 year
olds followed similar paths over the period, rising marginally up
to 2008 (to about 85%) and then falling by five percentage
points in 2009 (to 80%). Employment rates among people aged
45 and above fell by three percentage points, from 76% in
2007 to 73% in 2010. However, the employment rate among
younger workers fell by eleven percentage points, from 80% in
2007 to 69% in 2010. The recession had the largest impact on
the employment rates of young people, and resulted in a
considerable increase in the proportion of 16-24 year olds that
were not in work, in full-time education or on a government
training scheme. (Note that some of these will, however, be in
part-time education, apprenticeships, or other training
schemes.) To investigate these changes in employment rates in
more detail, we exploit panel data from the BHPS and
Understanding Society to identify changes in the labour market
status of people at dates of interviews in the relevant years.
Figures 2 and 3 summarise the proportion of people who were
not working in one year who were working in the subsequent
year, and the proportion of employed people who had left work
in the previous year.
Figure 2 reveals that the onset of recession had a large impact
on the inflows into employment among young people, but a
Figure 1 Employment rates by age: BHPS (2006-2008) and Understanding
Society (2009-2010)
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much smaller impact on the inflows into employment among
people aged above 24. For example, about 50% of 16-24 year
olds not working in 2006 were in work in 2007. However this
almost halved during the recession; 27% of those not working
in 2009 had a job in 2010. The employment inflow rate among
those aged 25-44 fell by only three percentage points, while
that among people aged 45 or above actually increased. That
is, part of the explanation for the fall in employment rates
during the recession among younger people was the large fall
in transitions into work.
Figure 3 highlights the impact of the recession on outflows
from employment. Again young people were particularly
affected. About 7% of employed 16-24 year olds in 2006 were
not in employment, full-time education or training in 2007,
and this outflow rate was similar for 2007 to 2008. More than
11% of employed young people in 2009 were not in
employment, full-time education or training in 2010. In
contrast, the increase in outflows from employment were much
smaller among people aged 25 and above – from about 3% to
4.5% among those aged between 25 and 44, and from 4.5% to
5.5% for those aged 45 and above. Hence we also find that the
recession had a larger impact on employment exits among
young people than among those aged over 24.
Panel data from the BHPS and Understanding Society
illustrates that the recession affected the employment prospects
of young people more than those of older workers. The large
fall in employment rates was caused by a combination of a
large fall in flows into work and increases in the exit from work
rates in this age group. This has a number of implications. For
example, previous research has shown a strong causal
relationship between being out of work at one point in time and
being out of work in the future.3-4 This suggests that the
relatively large proportion of young people who have been
adversely affected by the recent recession will experience lower
employment rates in later life, and so face the higher risks of
low income, poverty and deprivation that are associated with
non-employment. The challenge for policy makers is to ensure
that mechanisms are in place to maintain young people’s
attachment to the labour market on leaving education, and that
stable jobs become available as the economy emerges from
recession. This analysis paints an initial look at the impact of the
recession on employment transitions. Clearer patterns will
emerge as more Understanding Society data covering the
post-recessionary period become available.
Figure 3 Employment outflow rates by age: BHPS (2006-2008) and
Understanding Society (2009-2010)
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Key findings
• Employment of young people affected more by the
recession than that of older workers.
• The large fall in employment rates among young people
was caused by a combination of a large fall in flows into
work and increases in the exit from work.
• The challenge for policy makers is to ensure that
mechanisms are in place to maintain young people’s
attachment to the labour market on leaving education,
and that stable jobs become available as the economy
emerges from recession.
Further reading
1Gregg, P. & Wadsworth, J. (2010). Unemployment and
inactivity in the 2008–2009 recession.  Employment and
Labour Market Review, 4, 44–50.
2Jenkins, J. (2010). The labour market in the 1980s,
1990s, and 2008-2009 recessions. Employment and
Labour Market Review, 4, 29–36.
3Arulampalam, W., Booth, A. L., & Taylor, M. P. (2000).
Unemployment persistence. Oxford Economic Papers, 52,
24–50.
4Burgess, S., Propper, C., Rees, H. & Shearer, A. (2003).
The class of 1981: the effects of early career
unemployment on subsequent unemployment
experiences. Labour Economics, 10, 291–309.
Figure 2 Employment inflow rates by age: BHPS (2006-2008) and Understanding
Society (2009-2010)
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SPORTS PARTICIPATION 
OF ADULTS
| Jon Burton
The year 2012 sees the Olympics and
Paralympics come to the UK. At Wave 2 we
asked about participation in sports and the
frequency with which sporting activities are
undertaken. One of the strengths of a
longitudinal study such as Understanding
Society is that individual-level change in
behaviours can be measured with this second
wave used as a benchmark of sporting activity
in 2010-2011. 
These questions are scheduled to be asked every three waves,
so at Wave 5 (2013-2014) we will be able to see whether the
London 2012, and the increased media focus on sport during
that time, have been associated with sporting endeavours in
the United Kingdom. Some of the questions carried on
Understanding Society are also carried on the continuous
household survey ‘Taking Part’, which is managed by the
Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS). Whilst
Understanding Society cannot go into the depth of ‘Taking
Part’ in this topic area, it can complement research into
engagement with sport and culture with an important
longitudinal element. 
We also ask people how easy it is for them to get to a sports
centre or leisure centre and, for those who find it difficult, what
is stopping them from using sports facilities. Once again, we
will be able to use these data to see whether the building of
sports facilities around the country is associated with regular
participation in sport. 
This analysis is weighted to represent the distribution in the
overall UK population.  Only continuing respondents from
Wave 1 Year 1 are analysed – new entrants to the sample at
Wave 2 are excluded, as are the British Household Panel
Study sample.
Over half of those who responded said that they had
participated in one or more moderately intense sports during
the previous 12 months. The most common moderate
intensity sports were swimming or diving (34%); health, fitness,
gym or other conditioning activities (28%). The most common
mild intensity activity was rambling or walking for pleasure and
recreation (38%) and cycling (18%). 
Of those who took part in moderate intensity sport, over half
participated at least once a week (22% three or more times a
week, 30% at least once a week but fewer than three times a
week). A further 21% participated at least once a month but
less often than once a week. The remainder took part at least
three or four times a year (17%), twice a year (6%) or just once
a year (4%). More than one-quarter (27%) of those who
participate in a moderate sport are a member of a sports club. 
We divide the sample into those who take part in sport
frequently (at least once a week), those who participate less
frequently and those who do not participate at all. Just over
three in ten are frequent participants (31%), with just over four
in ten as non-participants (41%) and the remainder (28%) as
irregular participants. Figure 1 shows participation by age and
by sex; the category of non-participant is not displayed. Men
are more likely to be frequent participants than women (37%
compared to 30%) and less likely to do no sport (32%
compared to 41%). There is almost no difference in the
proportions of men and women who are irregular participants.
Sports participation declines with age; from 48% of 16-24
year olds being frequent participants down to 16% of those
aged 75 and over. Those in England and Scotland are more
likely to be irregular and frequent participants at sport than
those in Northern Ireland and Wales. Almost half of those in
Northern Ireland (49%) did no sport, with a slightly lower
proportion in Wales (46%). In Scotland and England, four in ten
(41%) did no sport.  
There is a relationship between education level and sports
participation; with 44.5% of those with a degree or higher
frequently participating in sport compared to one-third of
those with an A-level or equivalent (33.4%), three in ten of
those with GCSEs or equivalent (30.1%) and 15.6% of those
with no qualifications. Figure 2 shows the level of irregular and
frequent participation in moderate sport by selected socio-
demographic characteristics. 
Those aged over 16 who are still at school or are full-time
students are the most likely to frequently participate in
moderate intensity sports (47%), whilst those who are long-
term sick or disabled are the least likely (9%). Those who are
Figure 1 Participation in moderate sport over the last 12 months, by age and sex
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working are more likely to frequently participate (35% of the
employed, 34% of the self-employed) than those who are
unemployed (29%). Adults living in a household which did not
have access to a car were the most likely to do no sport (63%).
This proportion falls considerably for adults in households with
access to one car (44% do no sport) and again for households
with two cars (30%). Individuals who live in households with a
higher level of net income are more likely to participate in
sports, than those with a lower net income. Almost four in ten
of individuals from households in the highest quartile of
income participate in sport frequently (39%) compared to just
over two in ten individuals from the lowest quartile of
household net income (21%). 
One reason for not participating in sport would be the access
to leisure facilities. Of those who did no sport, 14% said that
they found it difficult (7.6%) or very difficult (6.8%) to access a
sport or leisure facility. This proportion was lower among those
who did some moderate sport (4.2% found it difficult, 1.4%
very difficult) and the
lowest among those
who participated in
sport frequently, with
2.8% finding it difficult
and 1.1% finding it very
difficult to access sports
facilities. 
For those who said that
they find it difficult to
get to a sports or leisure
facility, we asked what
made it difficult for them
to get to a sports or leisure facility. The barriers for those who
did no sport seem to be mainly poor health and motivation,
followed by the expense. For those who did no sport, almost
half (50%) said that their health or a disability made it difficult.
Over a quarter of those who did no sport said that they just
did not want to participate in sport or leisure activities. Other
common reasons among those who did no sport was that they
could not afford the costs (18%) or they had no access to a car
(16%). For those who participated in sport, but found it difficult
to get to a sports/leisure facility, the main barriers are lack of
time (mentioned by 43% of irregular and 34% of frequent
participants), cost (27% of irregular and 23% of frequent
participants) and the lack of facilities (20% of irregular and 29%
of frequent participants). 
We have found that the likelihood of participating in sport is
associated with some basic demographic characteristics; men
and those in younger age groups are more likely to participate
in sport. However, there is also a strong socio-economic
relationship with sport participation. In general, those who are
better educated and those who have a job which has a higher
social standing are more likely to participate regularly in sport.
We await Wave 5 data to see whether the London 2012 have
made sports activities open to the wider population.
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Key findings
• Over half of respondents participated in a moderately
intense sport; more than half of that group participated
at least weekly.
• Frequent participation was more likely for men, younger
persons, and those with higher qualifications.
• For those who did no sport, things that made it difficult
to get to a sports or leisure facility were poor health,
costs, or lack of access to a car.
Further reading
Thornton, G. (2011). Meta-Evaluation of the Impacts
and Legacy of the London 2012 Olympic Games and
Paralympic Games. Report 1, Scope, Research
Questions, and Data Strategy. Retrieved 13 February
2012, from
http://www.culture.gov.uk/images/publications/DCMS_2
012_Games_Meta_evaluation_Report_1.pdf. 
Taking Part. (2012). Retrieved 13 February 2012 from
http://www.dcms.gov.uk/what_we_do/research_and_sta
tistics/4828.aspx.
Figure 2 Participation in moderate sport by socio-demographic characteristics
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MEASURING WELL-BEING: WHAT YOU ASK 
IS WHAT YOU GET – OR IS IT?
| Steve Pudney | Annette Jäckle
In policy circles, well-being is in the air. In
November 2010, the British Prime Minister
announced plans for the Office for National
Statistics to develop official measures of well-
being, observing that ‘prosperity alone can't
deliver a better life’. Other national
governments and international organisations
are making similar extensions to the range of
welfare indicators they produce and monitor. 
Much of the discussion about well-being measurement has
focused on alternative concepts of well-being, but more
practical questions about survey design for subjective
questions may be equally important. Everyone knows that
the way you ask a question may influence the answer that
you get. There is no reason to expect survey questions on
subjective well-being to be an exception to this. Survey
methodologists have typically examined the impact of
question design and interview mode on simple statistics like
means and sample proportions. The well-being data,
however, need to be robust for complex comparisons and
statistical modelling. These aspects are addressed by the
following questions: (1) Which aspects of the survey and
questionnaire design affect the measurement of satisfaction
and the quality of research findings? and (2) Which design
should Understanding Society use to measure satisfaction?
A set of experiments related to the measurement of
satisfaction was implemented in the Understanding Society
Innovation Panel. Wave 1 (surveyed in 2008) carried an
experiment for measuring job satisfaction: 
• A random half of employees were asked a question with 7
possible answer categories (7-point scale):  ‘On a scale
from 1 to 7 where 1 means ‘completely dissatisfied’ and 7
means ‘completely satisfied’, how satisfied or dissatisfied
are you with your present job overall?’ 
• The other half were asked a question with 11 possible
answer categories (11-point scale): ‘On a scale from 0 to
10 where 0 means ‘completely dissatisfied’ and 10 means
‘completely satisfied’, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you
with your present job overall?’
Wave 2 (surveyed in 2009) carried several experiments with
five different questions measuring how satisfied respondents
were with their health, family income, leisure, life overall and
job:
• Two-thirds of the sample were randomly allocated to be
interviewed by telephone, the remaining third to be
interviewed face-to-face.
• Among face-to-face respondents, a random half were
allocated to answer the satisfaction questions privately,
using the interviewer’s laptop but without the interviewer
being involved (self-completion). For the other half the
interviewer administered the satisfaction questions. 
• For the face-to-face groups, a random half received
questions where only the end points were labelled (as in
the examples above). For the other half all scale points
were labelled: ‘Completely Satisfied, Mostly Satisfied,
Somewhat Satisfied, Neither Satisfied nor Dissatisfied,
Somewhat Dissatisfied, Mostly Dissatisfied, Completely
Dissatisfied’.
• For a random half of all respondents the question was
split in two, asking first about the direction of the
respondent’s satisfaction (whether satisfied, neither nor, or
dissatisfied), followed by a question about the strength of
(dis)satisfaction (somewhat, mostly or completely
(dis)satisfied). 
In the Wave 1 experiment, the 11-point scale answers were
less concentrated in the top values, but only few respondents
used the 5 lowest categories (see Figure 1). Contrary to
expectations, the 11-point format did not produce a more
fine-grained distribution of responses. In addition, the 11-
point scale seemed to encourage ‘blips’ at the extreme 0
value and at the mid-point 5, which are absent from the 7-
point scale (Figure 1). Further analyses showed that
responses from the 7-point scale were more highly
correlated with relevant characteristics: gender, age,
education and earnings. Responses from the 11-point scale
only correlated with education. We concluded that the 7-
point scale is likely to provide better quality data. This is the
format now used on Understanding Society. 
The results from the wave 2 experiments also suggest that
the survey design matters. Since analysts often combine the
top two response categories (‘completely’ or ‘mostly’ satisfied)
as an indication of ‘high satisfaction’, we examined the
percentage of respondents in different experimental
treatment groups who chose one of those two categories.
More people reported high job satisfaction when they were
asked over the telephone than face-to-face, when the
interviewer administered the question than when they
completed it themselves, when the scale points were fully
labelled than when only end points were labelled, and when
the question was broken into two questions instead of the
single question (Figure 2). These results were similar for
satisfaction with health, family income, leisure and life overall.
Also women’s responses were more strongly affected by the
survey design than men’s responses. Survey design therefore
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does affect responses, especially for women. 
To test the effect on research findings, we looked at the effect
of several respondent characteristics on satisfaction. Women
reported higher levels of job satisfaction than men with
similar characteristics. This gender difference was greater
with telephone interviewing than in face-to-face interviews.
Women also reported lower satisfaction when working more
hours.  Again, this difference was greater in the telephone
interviews. Survey design therefore affects research findings,
especially for differences between men and women.
Understanding Society now uses fully labelled response
scales and self-completion questions to measure satisfaction. 
In sum, the way we ask questions about satisfaction seems
to matter. Our conclusions are that:
• giving verbal labels to each point on the response scale
(which is infeasible for 11-point scales) improves data
quality;
• the greater confidentiality of paper- or computer-based
self-completion questionnaires improves data quality;
• interviewer visits to the home are preferable to telephone
interviewing;
• women seem to be more strongly influenced by question
design and interview mode than  men;
• the 1-7 response scale is preferable to the widely-used 0-
10 scale and gives continuity with the forerunner of
Understanding Society, the British Household Panel
Survey.
The Innovation Panel is an internationally unique research
resource.  It is a platform for developing and testing
methodologies for longitudinal survey research. The
Innovation Panel is a sample of 1,500 households that is a
constituent part of Understanding Society, although it is
surveyed independently. It is modelled on the main
Understanding Society survey and the results are therefore
applicable to it and other international household studies
with similar designs. Unlike the main survey, the Innovation
Panel is not designed to give geographical detail below the
UK level. Since 2010 there has been an annual open
competition for content on the Innovation Panel. Researchers
from around the world are invited to submit proposals for
methodological research. 
Further reading
Burton, J., Laurie, H. & Uhrig, S.C.N. (eds.) (2008).
Understanding Society. Some preliminary results from
the Wave 1 Innovation Panel. Understanding Society
Working Paper Series 2008-03. Colchester: University
of Essex.
http://research.understandingsociety.org.uk/publications/
working-paper/2008-03.
Burton, J., Laurie, H. &Uhrig, S.C.N. (eds.) (2010).
Understanding Society Innovation Panel Wave 2: Results
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Figure 1 Impact of the response scale categories on reported job satisfaction
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Source: Innovation Panel wave 1.
Figure 2 Impact of survey and question design on reported job satisfaction
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Source: Innovation Panel wave 2, Pudney 2010 Table 3.
Percent ‘mostly or completely satisfied’ with their job
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